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SUMMARY 
 
The general principle in criminal law is that a person is liable when committing a criminal 
offence. This may include an offence a person has facilitated or procured. Vicarious liability, 
a principle borrowed from civil law, is an exception to the general rule in that it allows for a 
person to be held liable for the criminal acts of another.  
 
Legal persons have no physical existence and do not have hands and brains like natural 
persons. A legal person acts through its directors, employees, members or representatives. 
The corporation, being distinct and separate from its agents, is held liable for the acts or 
omissions of its representatives. This liability exists even though the corporate body never 
acted. 
 
International recognition of corporate criminal liability can be based on vicarious liability, 
identification or aggregation. All these forms of liability are derived from the human actus 
and mens rea.   The identification theory provides for the liability of the corporate body, when 
someone who is identified with it, acted during the course of his employment when 
committing the offence. Those acts are treated as the acts of the corporate body. The 
identification theory is normally applied where mens rea is a requirement of the offence. The 
Aggregation theory provides for criminal liability of the corporation based on the conduct of a 
group of members of the company taken collectively. This theory is applied effectively where 
it is difficult to prove that a single person within the company is responsible for the 
commission of the offence. 
 
In South Africa corporate criminal liability developed  from vicarious liability. It is regulated 
by section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This liability is based on the 
special relationship between the director or servant and the corporate body. Corporations act 
through its agents. The agent can be a director, servant or a third person instructed by either of 
them.   
 
In terms of section 332(1) it is possible that the corporate body can be held liable even where 
the agent acted beyond the scope of his employment. The latter can be argued is an extension 
of vicarious liability.  Vicarious liability, can be argued, is too broad, because the intention of 
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the agent is imputed to the corporate body, without the enquiry of fault by the corporate body. 
This offends the general principles of substantive criminal law.  Generally, liability in 
criminal law accrues to someone who committed the offence with the required state of mind.  
The constitutionality of section 332(1) Act 51 of 1977 is questioned. 
 
The question is asked whether it is desirable to punish a legal person for the behaviour of its 
representatives or employees. Criminal law purports to control the behaviour of individuals to 
be in line with the interest and values of society. There is doubt whether the same goal can be 
achieved with the prosecution of corporate bodies. Prosecution of corporate bodies results in 
stigma to the corporation, which results in suffering a loss of reputation.  
 
Some authors argue that civil remedies can control the activities of corporate bodies more 
effectively.  This argument, however, fails to address the issue that criminal law concerns the 
harm inflicted by human beings, hence the need to regulate human conduct. Corporate 
criminal liability attempts to address the harm inflicted by corporate bodies. It regulates 
pollution, health, safety and business.  This liability is firmly established around the world but 
requires further development and modern refinement in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As a general rule only human beings can commit offences.  The exception is that corporate 
bodies also can be liable for corporate crime, despite absence of unlawful conduct and mens 
rea.1   
 
A corporate body is a legal person, with constitutional rights just like natural persons.  It is a 
separate person distinct from its members.2  
 
Corporate criminal liability developed through necessity. Courts are inundated with economic 
and environmental crime.  The majority of those offences result from corporate conduct, 
because a great deal of economic activity today takes place through corporations.3  
 
This research aims to examine corporate criminal liability in South Africa and will address the 
question whether or not the provisions of section 332 (1) of Act 51 of 1977 are sufficient for 
our needs. South African corporate criminal liability is based on agency.  
 
Chapter 2 examines the origin and development of corporate criminal liability.  Vicarious 
liability forms part of the agency model and applies in many legal systems. It is closely 
associated to South African corporate liability which is based on extended vicarious liability 
embodied in section 332(1) of Act 51 of 1977.  Chapter 2 further discusses the other two 
derivative models of corporate liability, namely identification and aggregation. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the historical development of corporate liability of in South Africa. 
 
In Chapter 4 the provisions of section 332(1) of 51 of 1977 are analysed and discussed. 
Chapter 5 addresses the question whether it is desirable to punish a corporate body.  
Corporate criminal liability and other liability strategies including civil liability are compared.  
The dissertation acknowledges that where crime exists there is need for punishment. 
                                                 
1  Snyman Criminal Law 4th ed (2002) 249. 
2  Card ,Cross & Jones Criminal Law 17th ed (2006) 858. 
3  Stessens “Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective” The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly Vol 43 No 3 (July 1994) 493-520. 
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 Chapter 6 outlines the need for possible review of section 322(1) and for harmonization of 
laws relating to corporate criminal liability.  
 2
CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES ON CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILTY 
 
2 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Criminal law, in general, provides for the punishment of unlawful human conduct.4 Only 
natural persons can act or form an intention.5 Criminal liability of a corporate body, e.g. a 
company or a close corporation is an exception to the general rule.6 A corporate body is a 
legal person. A juristic person is an abstract legal entity which lacks physical existence. It acts 
through its representatives or agents.7 
 
A corporate body like a company or close corporation is an association of persons, having a 
juristic personality, which is separate from that of its members.8 A corporate body is the 
bearer of rights and is liable for its own liabilities.9 The principle of existence separate from 
its members was confirmed in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd,10 where the court held that 
Salomon, the shareholder in the company, was not personally liable for debts of the company. 
The court held that a company exists separately even when controlled by a single person, 
because it is legally incorporated and complies with the requirements in the Company Act.11 
Where one person is entitled to all the profits he is not acting contrary to the intention of the 
Companies Act nor against public policy.12  
 
The courts have no general discretion to disregard the separate legal existence of a 
company.13 Various provisions in the Companies Act 61 of 197314 allow the courts to pierce 
                                                 
4  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3rd ed (2005) 562. Snyman Criminal Law 53. Clarkson & 
Keating Criminal Law 4th ed (1998) 228. Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law 5th ed (2006) 95-97. 
5  De Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg 4th ed (1985) 56. Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 2nd ed 
(1997) 327. 
6  Snyman Criminal Law 249, describes the juristic person as an “abstract body of persons, an institution or 
entity which can also be the bearer of rights and duties, without having a physical or visible body or a 
mind. 
7  Ngcwase v Terblanche NO 1977 3 SA 796 (A) 803-4. 
8  Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 3rd ed (2003) 57. Clarkson & Keating Criminal Law 231-232. 
9  Snyman Criminal Law supra. 
10  1897 AC 22. Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investment Pty (Ltd) 1995 4 SA 790 (A). 
11  Salomon v Salomon supra para 53. 
12  Supra. 
13  Gowers The Principles of Modern Company Law 5th ed (1992) 133. 
14  The ground for winding up in s 344(h) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. See also s 50(3), s 66, s 
172(5)(b), s 280(5), s 424 etc of Act 61 of 1973.  
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the corporate veil.15 Similarly section 65 of the Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984 allows the 
court to strip the corporation of its juristic personality as a separate entity if it abuses it.16 
From this it follows that a corporate body on its own cannot commit an offence intentionally 
and unlawfully17 because it has no physical existence separate from its members and only acts 
through its functionaries.18 
 
Corporate criminal liability can simply be described to be the liability of the corporate body 
for the unlawful criminal acts committed by its directors or employees. The basis for such 
liability is vicarious liability, personal liability for contravening a statutory duty and personal 
liability on the basis of attributing to the corporation the actus reus and mens rea of an 
individual.19 
 
The common law allows for a person to be held criminally responsible for an offence if he has 
“authorized or procured its commission or took part in it”.20A corporate body is prosecuted 
for the acts committed by its functionaries,21 and is liable for the unlawful act and culpability 
of the individual servant.22 In South Africa both the corporate body and its functionaries are 
prosecuted and punished.23 
 
2 2 THEORIES OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
Three main theories of corporate blameworthiness derive from the human actus reus and 
mens rea, namely: 
 
(i) agency or vicarious liability; 
(ii) identification; and 
(iii) aggregation. 
                                                 
15  Domanski “Piercing the Corporate Veil A New Direction” (1986) SALJ 224. LAWSA First Reissue 4 Part 
I Companies para 41 77. 
16  Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe 1996 4 SA 1063 (C). 
17  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 562. Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 9th ed (1999) 179. 
18  Reed & Seago Criminal Law 2nd ed (2002) 195. Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 101. 
19  Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 858. 
20  Burchell & Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. General Principles of Criminal Law 3rd 
ed (1997) 298. Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 851. 
21  Bailes “Watch Your Corporation” (1995) Vol 3 Pt 1 JBL 24. 
22  Burchell & Hunt South African Criminal and Procedure Vol. 1 General Principles of Criminal Law 298: 
They regard this liability as vicarious. 
23  Ss 332(1) and 332(5) Act 51 of 1997. 
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 These three theories seek to equate the corporate body’s culpability with that of an 
individual.24 They are derivative forms of liability. 
 
2 2 1 VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
Vicarious liability  can be described as the liability for the acts of another.25 The concept of 
vicarious liability developed in the English civil law of torts,26 where it held an employer 
liable for a delict committed by his employee, if done with the employer’s authority and in the 
scope of the employee’s employment.27 
 
The body corporate, who is guilty in terms of vicarious liability, has neither acted nor 
formulated the intention for the offence, but another person has done so on its behalf.28 
 
The English common law vicarious liability was the law of tort, and not applicable in criminal 
law.29 Two exceptions existed, namely common law cases of public nuisance and criminal 
libel where the employer could be held criminally liable for the acts of his employee.30 The 
employer was liable even if he was not aware of the actions of the latter.31 
 
Various statutes32 expressly imposed vicarious liability in criminal law.33 Vicarious liability 
imposed by statute could arise in four ways, namely:34 
 
(i) Express statutory provisions. 
(ii) Implied vicarious liability. 
                                                 
24  Bailes 1995 3(1) JBL 24. Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 562. 
25  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 171. Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 851. 
26  Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 2nd ed (2003) 243. Allen Criminal Law 8th ed (2005) 224. 
27  Burchell Principles of Delict (1993) Chapters 27-28. Reed & Seago Criminal Law 177. 
28  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 179. Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law 116. 
29  Huggins (1730) 2 Str 883, 93 ER 915. Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 171. 
30  Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 852. Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 243-244. 
31  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 172: Simester & Sullivan Criminal law 243-244. 
32  E.g. s 163 of the Licensing Act 26 of 1964 provided that “a person shall not, either himself or by his 
agent” do certain prohibited things. Section 55(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 12 of 1933 
provided for the liability of the parent to pay the fine for the child where he failed to exercise due care and 
control over the child. 
33  Reed & Seago Criminal Law 178: Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 244; Card, Cross & Jones Criminal 
Law 852. 
34  Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 244: Reed & Seago Criminal Law supra 178. 
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(iii) The licensee cases provides for liability of the licensee for failure by the licensee or 
his employee to comply with the conditions of his licence. 
(iv) The delegation principle. Liability arises from the delegation of powers. 
 
In Somerset v Hart35 the court held that delegation means the employer is liable for the 
intention of the employee on imputation, where there has been delegation of duties.36 It is a 
prerequisite to liability that there must be complete delegation of such powers.37 
 
Another example of vicarious criminal liability is found in National Rivers Authority v Alfred 
McAlpine Homes East Ltd,38 where the company was convicted for contravention of section 
85(1) of the Water Resources Act 1991 in that its employees allowed wet cement to pollute 
the controlled waters. The court held that aim of the section was to keep streams free from 
pollution for the benefit of plants and mankind. This offence was created to protect the 
environment by holding the company criminally liable for acts and omissions of its 
employees performed during the scope of their employment.39 
 
2 2 1 1 LIMITATIONS ON VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
Vicarious liability can be limited in three ways, namely40 where the offence is not committed 
in furthering or endeavouring to further the interest of the body corporate;41 where the 
employee’s acts amount to aiding and abetting, and where there was an attempt to commit the 
offence.42 
 
Where limitations apply the employer cannot be vicarious liable for the agent’s action, 
because of imputed knowledge.43 For example, in Ferguson v Weaving44 a licensee was 
charged for abetting customers in consuming liquor in his licensed premises after hours. It 
appeared that all proper steps were taken except for her waiter’s omission to collect liquor 
                                                 
35  1884 12 QBD 360 362 per Lord Coleridge CJ. 
36  Allen v Whitehead 1930 1 KB 211 DC. 
37  Vane v Yinnaopoullos 1965 AC 486. 
38  1994 4 All ER 286 QB. 
39  Supra. 
40  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 558-559. Allen Criminal Law 228. 
41  Coppen v Moore No2 1898 2 QB 306. 
42  Gardner v Akeroyed 1952 2 QB 743. See Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 179. 
43  Ferguson v Weaving 1951 1 KB 814. 
44  Supra. 
 6
from customers. The court held she could aid and abet where she knew that customers were 
committing the offence. The court was not prepared to hold the licensee liable by imputing 
her waiter’s knowledge to her as the aider or abettor where she was not charged as principal 
offender.45 That would have been tantamount to creation of a new principle in criminal law. 
 
In Adams v Camfoni46 the licence holder was found not guilty and discharged for supplying 
liquor outside the permitted hours because the sale was concluded by a messenger boy who 
had no authority to sell.  
 
An attempt to commit an offence is founded in common law, and there is no vicarious 
liability for the principal where the agent attempted to commit an offence even if the offence 
so attempted would create vicarious liability.47 
 
2 2 1 2 JUSTIFICATION FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
Vicarious liability was used by the courts to hold corporations liable for non-compliance with 
regulations which direct the sale of food, drugs etc.48 There is belief that, if this liability is 
imposed on the employers, they in turn will stop their employees from contravening the 
relevant statutes.49 It is further argued that a strict vicarious liability could be a good deterrent 
if the corporation is strictly liable for all the crimes committed by its functionaries.50 
 
The proponents of vicarious liability believe that employers who spend money to detect crime 
committed by employees at their places of work should get lesser fines because they make 
efforts to prevent crime. Corporate crime should be subject to a fine equal to the social cost of 
crime, divided by the probability of detection, because this forces the corporation to 
internalize the social cost of its activity.51  
 
The issue is whether imposing strict vicarious liability provides the body corporate with an 
incentive to apply measures of deterring the crime. Some commentators argue that  pure strict 
                                                 
45  Supra. 
46  1929 1 KB 95 DC. 
47  Gardner v Akeroyed supra. 
48  Supra. 
49  Reynolds v GH Austin & Sons Ltd 1951 2 KB 135. 
50  Becker “Make the Punishment Fit the Corporate Crime” Bus Wk (1989) 22 Col 2. 
51  Supra. 
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vicarious liability creates an irreconcilable conflict between two possible goals, namely 
competent enforcement measures and competent effective production.52 To be effective in 
reducing crime, vicarious criminal liability must be able to compel the corporate body to use 
internal measures to control the social cost of crimes associated with its activities.53 
 
Strict vicarious liability can only be effective when the courts are to consider the 
corporation’s actual enforcement strategies implemented when sentencing them.54 This will 
result in those corporate bodies that allocate more resources to detect crime, receiving fewer 
fines. The latter view is supported as it will encourage companies to allocate resources to 
detect crimes, which may not be easy to investigate. It is submitted that those companies who 
have proved to be applying due diligence should either be given lesser fines or be exonerated 
from blame. 
 
Vicarious liability is the best tool to compel corporations to comply with statutes.55 
Corporations, which are subject to vicarious criminal liability, do not take probability of 
detection for granted but allocate resources to ensure that there is balance between detection 
and resultant liability.56 
 
2 2 1 3 CRITISICM AGAINST VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
According to Read and Seago vicarious liability can be both too broad and too narrow.57 It is 
too narrow or under-inclusive because it can only be committed through the unlawful act of a 
natural person.58 Where the body corporate is the wrongdoer, the courts are concerned with 
the fault of a natural person and not the corporate fault even where the latter fault is clear.59 
                                                 
52  Arlen “The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Law” Vol 23 (June 1994) Journal of Legal 
Studies 883-867, 847. 
53  Arlen 1994 Journal of Legal Studies supra 849. 
54  Card, Cross & Jones Criminal law 857. 
55  Supra. Card, Cross & Jones maintain that this statement has not been proved. They further argue that 
vicarious liability could be justified if it was limited to negligent employers who fail to control the 
contravention. 
56  Arlen “The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Law” supra 844. 
57  Reed & Seago Criminal 185. 
58  Mousell Bros Ltd London and North-Western Rly Co 1917 2 KB 836. 
59  Coopen v Moore (No 2) (1989) 2 QB 306. 
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On the other hand, it is too broad, because once the individual liability is established, the body 
corporate is liable whether it has fault or not.60  
 
The results of the broad terms of vicarious liability are that the body corporate can be liable 
even if the employee acted against the clear instructions and policies of the body corporate.61 
This occurs frequently where liability of the body corporate is extended to all employees.62  It 
is submitted that the corporate body should rather be provided with a defence based on due 
diligence.63 This means that where the company uses all available reasonable means to avoid 
crime it should be exonerated because of its diligence. 
 
Vicarious liability treats corporate bodies differently because the fault enquiry is not required 
for corporate bodies, while it is required for natural persons.64 In terms of the South African 
Constitution legal persons have the  same rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights as natural 
persons.65 It is argued that imposing vicarious liability on corporate bodies is unfair, because 
it stigmatizes a company when it is charged with a criminal offence.66 Vicarious liability also 
damages the reputation of the body corporate and punishes its shareholders.67 
 
Although in theory vicarious criminal liability often requires that the agent intended to benefit 
the corporation, this rule does not effectively limit the scope of vicarious liability in any 
significant way.68 E.g. corporations do not commit corporate crime, but their agents commit 
crimes in order to benefit themselves.69 The agent may commit a crime that incidentally 
benefits the corporation, but the benefit to the corporation is not the agent’s primary 
motivation, but purely incidental. The agent commits crime for his or her personal needs 
within the scope of his employment. A company can be criminally liable even if it was 
                                                 
60  Colvin “Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability” (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 1 at 8, cited by 
Clarkson & Keating Criminal Law 231. 
61  Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 857. 
62  Reed & Seago Criminal Law 185. 
63  Arlen “The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Law” supra 840. 
64  Supra. 
65  S 8 of the Constitution Act 108 1996. 
66  Supra. 
67  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 186; Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law supra 251. 
68  Arlen“The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Law” supra 838. 
69  Arlen & Carney “Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets; Theory & Evidence” (1992) (11) 
Law Review 691. 
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defrauded by its controlling officer if the offence was committed within the scope of his 
office.70 
 
2 2 2 IDENTIFICATION THEORY 
 
The theory of identification is often referred to as the alter ego doctrine.71 This theory is 
applied in English law and some other jurisdictions.72 This theory recognizes certain senior 
individuals as being the company itself, and the acts of these individuals are regarded as that 
of the company.73 
 
In HL Bolton Co Ltd v PJ Graham and Sons Ltd74Lord Denning explained this theory as 
follows: 
 
“A company may in ways be linked to a human body. It has a brain and nerve centre which 
controls what it does. It also has hands, which hold the tools and act in accordance with 
directions from the nerve centre. Some people in the company are mere servants and agents 
who are nothing more than hands to do work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will 
of the company. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will 
of the company and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of 
mind of the company, and is treated by law as such.” 
 
From this passage quoted it follows that those who are directing the mind and will of the 
corporation are the company.75 These people include directors, managers and those who have 
powers that were delegated to them, having full discretion to act independently of the 
instruction from the management.76 The application of the identification theory is very similar 
to vicarious liability.77 The company’s blameworthiness is deduced from the human state of 
mind and conduct.78 This form of liability has no application in South Africa. 
 
                                                 
70  Moore v Bressler Ltd 1944 2 All ER 515 DC. 
71  Reed & Seago Criminal Law supra. Leigh The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law (1969) 
91. R v ICR Haulage Ltd (1944) 30 Criminal Appeal Reports 31. 
72  USA, Canada, New Zealand etc. 
73  Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 254. Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 860-862. Burchell & Milton 
Principles of Criminal Law 562. 
74  1957 1 QB at 159. 
75  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 184. 
76  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 182. 
77  Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law supra 255. 
78  Supra. 
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2 2 2 1 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF IDENTIFICATION 
 
The identification doctrine focuses at the top echelon of the body corporate and its application 
is to a certain degree predictable.79 The senior officers identify the state of mind of the 
company.80 In terms of this test liability is attributed to a person to whom the general 
management of the corporation has been delegated.81 He can be a manager to whom directors 
have delegated full authority to administer affairs of the corporation.82 
 
In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission83 the question was 
whether the knowledge of one of the two senior investment managers could be attributed to 
the corporate body. The court held that the senior investment managers’ act and mind could 
be attributed to Meridian.  The court held that the “directing mind and will” test was not 
always appropriate, and attribution of knowledge should not be confined to the standard 
principle of “brains and hands” of a company which was a general term not applicable in all 
cases.  At times the acts and mind of someone lower in the institution could be attributed to 
the corporation.84 The manner of interpretation of a rule in each case indicates how it was 
intended to apply.85 The court must establish whether an act and knowledge were intended to 
be that of the company. The court arrives at its conclusion by using the rules of interpretation 
taking into account the language of the statute, its content and policy.86 
 
Where the company is multifaceted with different managerial levels it is difficult to identify 
the controlling officer.87  
 
There are cases where managers could not be identified with their companies or where courts 
refused to accept that they were fully representing their companies.88 In Redfern,89 the Court 
of Appeal held that the sales manager was not senior enough to be identified with the 
company. In limited companies, the principle of identification is limited to those people 
                                                 
79  Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 255. 
80  Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v Graham & Sons 1957 1 QB 159 172. 
81  Supra. See also criticism by Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 861-862. 
82  Supra. 
83  1995 2 A.C. 500. 
84  Supra. 
85  Supra. 
86  Supra. 
87  Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 862. 
88  Magna Plant Ltd v Mitchell 1996 Crim LR 696: Readhead Freight Ltd v Schulman 1988 Crim LR 696. 
89  1993 Crim LR 43. 
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whose names appear in memorandum and articles of the association.90 In P & O Ferries 
(Dover Ltd),91 the company faced charges for culpable homicide after the ship owned by it 
sank with passengers. The shipmaster was not identified with the corporation.92 
 
The Company was found not guilty and discharged for manslaughter. The Law Commission 
found that the corporate body should on the ground of public policy be liable for serious 
accidents resulting from gross negligence due to failure of the management.93 As a result the 
Law Commission recommended a new offence based on corporate fault.94  
 
Allen95 lists four problems with the identification theory, namely: 
 
(1) In large and diverse companies, the manager has no control over the company affairs. In 
Tesco Store Ltd v Brent96 the court asked how the controlling officer in the head office, 
i.e. London, can know the age of a person to whom a video is supplied in a store in 
another town. In this case mens rea is not an element of the offence but due diligence is 
a defence. 
(2) The court decision in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia v Securities 
Commission has weakened the principle of identification, since the company was 
convicted based on interpreting the statute, but not based on the actions of the 
controlling officers.97 
(3) Where there is more than one controlling officer, should each officer be proved to have 
mens rea? Where the answer is positive, this will be tantamount to aggregation. 
 
2 2 3 AGGREGATION THEORY 
 
This theory is also referred to as the collective knowledge doctrine,98 which is used in USA 
but not South Africa. This liability is based on the sum total of knowledge and acts of the 
                                                 
90  Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass supra 200. 
91  1990 93 Cr App R 72. 
92   Supra. 
93  MV Herald of Free Enterprise Report of the Court No. 8074 Dept of Transport 1987. See also Smith & 
Hogan Criminal Law Cases and Materials 8th ed (2002) 290. 
94  S 4 of the Law Com No. 237 Involuntary Manslaughter (1996). 
95  Allen Criminal Law 231-233. 
96  1993 2 All ER 718. 
97   1995 3 All ER 918. 
98  Herring Criminal Law 5th ed (2005) 125. 
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various employees of the corporate body who were at fault where it is not possible to single 
out one employee within the corporation, who committed a wrongful act.99 The corporation is 
held liable in order to prevent corporations trying to evade liability by making fragments and 
division of duties of its employees in order to hide its responsibility deep within the corporate 
structure.100 
 
The corporation may accept the blameworthiness of those associated with it.101 It is not the 
fault of one person, which determines the liability, but the collective fault of all the employees 
together.102 The theory of aggregation is closely related to the newly proposed form of 
liability called corporate guilt which is based on corporate culture and policies of the 
corporation.103 In terms of the corporate guilt it is the corporate body on its own which is 
liable by failing to cultivate a certain culture and policies laid down for its employees. This is 
not a derivative form of liability. 
 
The aggregation theory is applied where negligence is an element of the offence and104 not in 
offences that require intention.105 Its use in cases where intention is the element of the offence 
amounts to artificial manufacturing of fault.106  
 
2 2 3 1 EVALUATION OF THE AGGREGATION THEORY 
 
This theory also has the disadvantage in that it does not lift the corporate veil.107 Instead of 
looking for one single individual whose liability can be attributed to the corporate body one 
focuses on several persons. The doctrine ignores the reality that the corporation has a duty to 
put measures in place to ensure that not only must individuals be prevented from committing 
offences but it must put policies in place in order to prevent the commission of crime by a 
group of persons.108 
 
                                                 
99  Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 260. 
100  United States v Bank of New England 821 F 2d 844 (1st Cir), cert denied, 484 US 943 (1987). 
101  Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 260. 
102  Clarkson & Keating Criminal Law 240. 
103  Supra. 
104  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 186. 
105  United States v LBS Bank – New York, Inc., 757 F.Supp 496, 501 n 7 1990. 
106  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 185-6. 
107  Clarkson & Keating Criminal Law 240. 
108  Supra. 
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Applying the aggregation theory can result in stigma to persons charged when they in fact 
committed no offence at all.109 People representing the corporate body are at times subjected 
to criticism in courts and linked to the guilty verdict of the body corporate, with possible 
adverse consequences.  
 
The doctrine of aggregation could be accepted if the corporation possesses moral and agency 
duties in the same way as a natural person would have.110  
 
2 3 CONCLUSION 
 
Corporate criminal liability in South Africa is based on vicarious liability. This liability 
covers both the corporation and its functionaries. It is a liability which canvasses different 
kinds of offences. It is wide enough to include third parties. The company can have 
knowledge and form intention through its human functionaries. The knowledge of the people 
who can speak, act or think for the body corporate is attributed to it. 
 
                                                 
109  Simester and Sullivan Criminal Law 260. 
110  Simester and Sullivan Criminal Law supra. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In R v Werner111 the court held that the master is liable for the offences committed by his 
servant if he knew or foresaw that there was likelihood for the contravention of the statute, or 
had culpa in failing to foresee.112 Fault and the unlawful act by the employee acting within 
the scope of his employment, are requirements for liability.113  
                                                
 
3 2 ROMAN LAW 
 
Under Roman law the whole community was sometimes held liable for the wrong actions of 
one of its members, even though they were innocent regarding the commission of the 
unlawful act.114 The primitive family was a corporation, represented by the Paterfamilias in 
Roman law.115 He held possessions of the members in trust for the family. He was able to sue 
or be sued.116 It is not clear whether Roman law up to the time of Justinian conceived the 
corporation as a juristic person as we know it today.117  The Institute by Gaius divided the law 
into law of persons, things and actions. Gaius only refers to res universitas, i.e. corporate 
property.118  
 
In his Digest he uses the word corporations and not legal persons.119 Romans invented the 
idea of a corporation, where two or more persons combined their resources in order to achieve 
a desired result.120 They developed the concept of a separate legal entity, when 
 
111  R v Werner 1917 EDL 71, 79. 
112  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 560. 
113  Supra 558. 
114  Snyman Criminal Law 247. 
115  Maine Ancient Law: Its Connection with Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas (1905) 
184. 
116  Supra 185-187. 
117  Burdick The Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to Modern Law (1989) 274. 
118  Supra 277. 
119  Supra 285. 
120  Supra. 
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acknowledging the existence of public and private corporations.121 The corporation could sue 
or be sued, with no liability attaching to its members.122  In Roman law, corporate criminal 
liability was unknown.123 
 
3 3 ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 
 
Juristic persons were known in Roman-Dutch law. Corporations could acquire property, sue 
or be sued.124 Academic writers doubt whether corporate criminal liability existed.125 Kahn 
states that in Roman law and possibly, in classical Roman-Dutch Law the corporation could 
not commit an actus reus or have mens rea.126 
 
3 4 COMMON LAW 
 
Corporate criminal liability in our law is based on vicarious liability.127 The common law 
accepted that the corporate body, just like a natural person, is criminally responsible for a 
contravention of law committed by its agent or servant while acting within the scope of his 
agency or course of employment.128 This was not applicable where the actus reus could not 
be performed by a legal person, where the legislature restricted the commission of an offence 
only to natural persons and where penalty provided could be chastisement or imprisonment. It 
is fictitious in nature and cannot be incarcerated.129 
 
Where knowledge is an element of the offence, the knowledge of the agent was imputed to the 
master or the employer even where he neither wilfully permitted the act nor authorized it.130 
In Charter v Freeth & Pocock Ltd,131 there was sale to the detriment of the purchaser, who 
bought goods not in the nature and quality expected. The court held that the intention of the 
                                                 
121  Supra. 
122  Supra 291. Digest 3; 4, 7. 
123  De Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg 51-53. 
124  Lee An Introduction to Roman Dutch Law 5th ed (1961) 117. 
125  De Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg 51-55. 
126  Kahn “Can a Corporation be Found Guilty of Murder? The Criminal Liability of a Corporation” (1990) 
BML 145-146. 
127  Jordaan “New Perspectives on the Criminal Corporate Liability of Corporate Bodies” (2003) Acta 
Juridica 49. She states that vicarious liability has played a predominant role in the development of 
corporate criminal liability in South Africa. 
128  Gardiner & Landsdown South African Criminal Law & Procedure Vol 1 (1917) 34. 
129  Gardiner & Landsdown South African Criminal Law & Procedure 5th ed (1946) 61. 
130  In Bezuidenhout v Boksburg Municipality 1916 TPD 555. The owner paid fine for cattle that strayed to the 
municipal commonage. 
131  105 LT 238. 
 16
legislature cannot be limited to natural persons and the corporate body was held liable on the 
basis of vicarious liability. Initially, vicarious liability in criminal law was based on the 
contravention of a statutory provision.132 
 
The common law recognized the corporation as an artificial person with legal personality.133 
The wider meaning of the word “person” was recognised by Parliament which defined a 
“person” as local government, an incorporated body or registered company.134 Section 390 of 
the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act135 extended the same interpretation to all 
corporations and certain associations. 
 
Although our corporate criminal liability was similar to vicarious liability, there were certain 
exceptions where the body corporate could not be liable, namely where:136 
 
(i) The conduct demands that a natural person should act, e.g. rape and bigamy, and 
offences, which can only be committed with a human body. 
(ii) The legislature or statute provided that only natural persons can commit the offence. 
(iii) The penal provisions for the offence committed cannot be applied to a juristic person, 
i.e. imprisonment or death penalty. Where it is not possible to prosecute the corporate 
body for the offence, the individual who committed the offence must be charged. 
 
In addition to the instances above where the corporate body could not be liable, certain 
offences could not be committed by the corporate body, e.g.137 offences committed with a 
wicked intention, treason, murder, assault, arson, perjury and similar offences. 
 
Under the common law a juristic person could not be held liable for an offence requiring mens 
rea, because the corporation has no mind of its own.138 
 
                                                 
132  Gardiner & Landsdowne South African Criminal Law and Procedure 6th ed Vol 1 (1957) 78. 
133  Supra. 
134  S 3 of Act 5 of 1910. 
135  Act 31 of 1917. 
136  Gardiner & Landsdowne South African Criminal Law & Procedure Vol 1 45. 
137  Supra 45-46. 
138  Charter v Freeth & Pocock Ltd supra. 
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3 5 STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT 
3 5 1 THE PERIOD FROM 1917 
 
Corporate criminal liability was regulated by statute since 1917. The statute law of 1917, 
however, failed to alter the common law position.139 
 
Section 384 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 provided that in any 
criminal proceedings under statute or common law against the company, the secretary, 
manager or chairperson thereof may be charged with the offence unless it is otherwise 
directed or provided. He shall be liable to be punished for the offence unless it is proved that 
he was in no way a part thereto. That was a change from common law position. 
 
This section has been described as a poor piece of legal draftsmanship since it dealt with 
procedural law140 and not with substantive law on the liability of the body corporate. Courts 
struggled to apply this legislation because it was still the civil law application of vicarious 
liability without changing the substantive law part of common law.141 This provision was the 
brainchild for the enactment of the next Act.142  
 
3 5 2 THE PERIOD FROM 1939 
 
Section 384 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 was later amended by 
section 117 of Act 23 of 1939. The corporate body was held liable for offences under statute, 
common law or byelaw committed by its directors or servants or at their instruction.143 This 
provision applied to both conduct and omissions, which were performed in the exercise of 
their duties, or in furthering the interests of the corporate body.144 Those acts or omissions 
were deemed to have been performed by the corporate body itself.145 The latter provision was 
a major move to extend vicarious liability.146 These provisions are still present in the current 
legislation and will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
                                                 
139  Burchell & Hunt SA Criminal Law & Procedure (1983) Vol 1 396. 
140  Kahn “Can a Corporation be Found Guilty of Murder? The Criminal Liability of a Corporation” supra. 
141  Supra. 
142  S 117 Act 23 of 1939. 
143  S 384 of the Criminal Procedure Act and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 as amended. 
144  Supra. 
145  Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass 1972 AC 153 170; 1971 2 All ER 127 (HL) 131: El Ajou v Dollar 
Land Holdings plc 1994 2 All ER 685 (CA) 695.  
146  Barlow “The Criminal Liability of a Company: Its Directors and Its Servants” (1946) 63 SALJ 502. 
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 In R v Bennet & Co (Pty) Ltd147 the court decided that a limited company was criminally 
liable for the negligent acts of one of its servants in terms of the provisions of section 384(1) 
of 1917, as amended. The company was convicted of culpable homicide. The apprentice of 
the company died as a result of the negligence of another servant of a company. Section 384 
of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, as amended, dealt with substantive issues of 
corporate criminal liability and was no longer limited to procedural law. It was clear from the 
section that where proof of any intent is necessary to constitute crime, the intent is that of the 
physical actor.148 
 
The purpose of section 384(1) of 1917, as amended by 1939 enactment was to remove the 
restrictions that previously existed in common law.The common law provided that a corporate 
body could not be convicted of an offence requiring mens rea. In R v Durban Baking Co149 
the court decided that a corporate body is liable for offences requiring mens rea because the 
language used in the statute was so clear that no other interpretation could be justified.150 The 
court further held that the corporate body used its functionaries to formulate the required 
intent.151 
 
Both the wrongful act and the intent of a director or servant of a corporation were deemed to 
be that of the corporation itself.152 Where the director or servant acted ultra vires, but in 
furthering or endeavouring to further the interest of the corporate body, the act or omission of 
a director or servant was deemed to be the act of the corporation itself.153 
 
In R v Phillips Dairy,154 the court held that section 384(1) of Act 31 of 1917, as amended, is 
substantive law and it makes a limited company criminally liable as an employer, even in 
cases where private employers would not be so liable. This means the company is liable even 
where the employee acted ultra vires, as long as he or she was furthering the interests of the 
                                                 
147  1941 TPD 194. 
148  Supra 
149  1945 NPD 136. 
150  Supra. 
151  Supra. 
152  Supra. 
153  R v Bennett supra 194. 
154  1955 2 SA 120 (T). 
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company.155 This extended the liability of corporate bodies beyond the accepted limits of 
vicarious liability.156 
 
In R v Van Heerden,157 the company was convicted of fraud, despite the defence that the other 
accused acted as a servant of the company and not as director. In Mkize v Martens,158 the 
court explained the reason for the liability of the company for the acts of its employees as 
follows:159 
 
“…I am answerable for the wrongs of my servant or agent, not because he is authorised by 
me, but because he is about my affairs, and I am bound to see that my affairs are conducted 
with due regard to the safety of others.” 
 
3 5 3 THE PERIOD FROM 1955 
 
Section 384 of Act 31 of 1917 was replaced with section 381 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
56 of 1955. The statutory provision incorporated corporate criminal liability into our legal 
system. It provided that a body corporate is liable for an act or omission done with intent or 
without by the employee in the course of his duties, furthering the interest of the corporate 
body. The employee’s actions are then deemed to have been performed by the body corporate. 
 
Whether a body corporate can be liable for wrongful acts by agents of another body corporate 
should be investigated. Where a body corporate instructs another body corporate to do a 
certain piece of work, the former, if it does not exercise control over the latter’s employees at 
work, is not liable for the criminal actions performed by one of those employees.160  
 
3 6 CONCLUSION 
 
Historical development of corporate criminal liability in South Africa shows that corporate 
criminal liability is wider than the vicarious liability of natural persons.161 Corporate criminal 
liability is founded on attribution to the corporate body of crimes committed by its agents or 
                                                 
155  Supra. 
156  Supra. 
157  1946 AD 168. 
158  1914 A.D 382. 
159  Pollock Torts 8th ed 78. 
160  R v Murray & Stewart 1950 1 SA 194 (C). 
161  Hunt South African Criminal Law & Procedure: General Principles of Criminal Law 3rd ed (1997) Vol 1 
299. 
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officers rather than on vicarious liability.162 This argument is supported when one considers 
its development and founding principles.  
 
The provisions of statute extended the scope of vicarious liability in common law, which had 
limited vicarious liability to corporations in the same way as natural persons.163 The extension 
of criminal provisions to corporate bodies depended on the wording of the penal statute, 
whether it was such that the artificial person can serve the punishment.164 South Africa 
adopted the strategy of punishing both the body corporate and the actual wrongdoer.165  
                                                 
162  Supra. 
163  Barlow “The Criminal Liability of a Company: Its Directors and Its Servants” 502. 
164  Gardiner & Landsdowne South African Criminal Law and Procedure 78. 
165  The provision directed to punish the directors and officers of the company was s 318(7) of Act 56 of 
1955. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CURRENT CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate criminal liability is currently regulated by section 332 of the Criminal Procedural 
Act, 51 of 1977. This section has twelve subsections which deal with substantive as well as 
procedural law. Of importance for this discussion are the provisions of section 332(1), which 
are substantive law, meaning that they deal with principles of law applicable to corporate 
criminal liability in South Africa. Reference shall be made to a lesser extent to sections 332(5) 
and 332(7) which deal with procedure relating to corporate criminal liability. 
 
4 2 SECTION 332(1) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977 
 
Section 332(1) provides that, for the purpose of imposing upon a corporate body criminal 
liability for any offence, whether under any law or at common law: 
 
(a) any act performed, with or without a particular intent, by or an instruction or with 
permission, express or implied, given by a director or servant of that corporate body; 
and  
(b) the omission, with or without a particular intent, of any act which ought to have been 
but was not performed by or on instructions given by a director or servant of that 
corporate body, 
 
in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as such director or servant or 
in furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of that corporate body, shall be deemed 
to have been performed by that corporate body, or as the case may be, to have been an 
omission on the part of that corporate body. 
 
In chapter 2166 it was indicated that corporate criminal liability in section 332(1) of Act 51 of 
1977 is based on vicarious liability. The  wording of the provisions of section 332(1) is 
                                                 
166  See the conclusion para 2 3 in Chapter 2. 
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similar to that of the old section 384(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 
1917, as amended in 1939, and section 381(1) of Act 56 of 1955 its predecessor. It is broader 
than normal vicarious liability, because it includes not only servants but also third parties 
instructed by those servants whose actions are accountable to the body corporate.167 
 
4 2 1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LIABILITY IN TERMS OF SECTION 
332(1) 
 
A body corporate is criminally liable for the unlawful acts of its agents and those persons 
instructed by its agents.168 This liability is based on attribution.169 A body corporate, such as a 
public and private company, local authority or any other incorporated body may be criminally 
liable in the same manner as a natural person.170   
 
4 2 1 1 THE ACT OR OMISSION 
 
To be convicted of a crime the accused must have acted or failed to act. The prohibited 
conduct is called the actus reus. An omission occurs where someone fails to act when having 
a duty to act. In certain crimes an omission, namely failure to act in circumstances where the 
law requires a person to act, is sufficient. Since the body corporate has no physical existence 
the act or omission attributed to it must be that of a human being.171  
 
The conduct or omission must have been performed by the director or servant during the 
course of exercising his or her duties as a director or servant of the company.172 The act or 
omission must further the interest of the body corporate.173 The difference between the actus 
reus and the omission in terms section 332(1) is that, only the actus reus can be performed 
with express or implied permission of the director or employee of the corporate body.174 
 
                                                 
167  In s 332(1) Act 51 of 1977 reference is made to someone instructed by the director or servant. Unlike in 
vicarious liability where the master is liable only for the acts of his servant. 
168  S 332(1). See Snyman Criminal Law 250. 
169  Supra. 
170  Allen Criminal Law 229: Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 858. 
171  Jordaan “New Perspectives on the Criminal Corporate Liability of Corporate Bodies” 48. 
172  S 332(1) Act 51 of 1977.  
173  Supra. 
174  Supra. 
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Since section 332(1) is vicarious in nature, the director or the servant of the corporate body 
acts on behalf of or for the company as representative agent or delegate.175 Both the act and 
the mind of the agent are deemed to be that of the body corporate.176  
 
4 2 1 2 FAULT  
 
Liability in criminal law in most cases requires mens rea to commit an offence. There are few 
instances where there is liability without fault. Liability for wrongful conduct has to 
correspond with the definitional elements of the crime in order to be culpable.177 Culpability 
means that there must be grounds for blaming the individual personally for his unlawful 
conduct.178 In order to be culpable, a person must have intention, or have been negligent.179  
 
In terms section 332(1) the corporate body is criminally liable for an act performed by its 
director or servant when performed with or without intent. Since the corporate body has no 
mind of its own the law attributes the state of mind of certain persons to the corporate 
body.180 Burchell and Milton181 submit that section 332(1) removes the obstacles in regard to 
attaching criminal liability on juristic persons and affirms that this artificial person could be 
convicted of a crime requiring fault. Although the corporation is charged, the fault that is 
imputed to the company is that of the director or servant who committed the crime.182  
                                                
 
Since a juristic person is afforded the same rights as a natural person in the Bill of Rights,183 
Jordaan argues that section 332(1) can be challenged for being too broad. It extends liability 
to the corporate body that could not be extended to a natural person.184  A corporate body can 
be convicted without it having being proved that it had been at fault.185 
 
 
175  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 566. Bailes “Watch Your Corporation” 24. 
176  Supra. 
177  Snyman Criminal Law 143. 
178  Supra. 
179  Such as culpable homicide. 
180  Lennard`s Carrying Company Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd 1915 A.C. 705. 
181  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 386 supra. 
182  Supra.  
183  S 8(4) Constitution Act 108 of 1996.  
184  Jordaan “New Perspectives on the Criminal Corporate Liability of Corporate Bodies” 48 53.  
185  HL Bolton Co Ltd v PJ Graham and Sons Ltd 1957 1 QB 159. 
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4 2 1 2 1 INTENTION 
 
An intention to commit an offence can be defined as the knowledge and the will to perform an 
act which has consequences outlined in the definitional elements of crime.186 This intention 
can either be dolus directus, dolus indirectus or dolus eventualis. 
 
Section 322(1) provides that the particular intention of the director or servant is attributed to 
the corporate body. In Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re S v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation, the court held that word “particular” has no intended results and refers to any 
relevant intention with which the act was committed.187 
 
Practice has shown that it is not easy to identify and prove that a particular individual from a 
big company has acted and that he had the required intention.188 In Ex parte Minister of 
Justice; In re S v SABC,189 no particular individual employee was identified.  In this case it 
was held that the scope of corporate liability in section 332(1) is wide enough to include 
offences based not only on intention but also on negligence and strict liability.190 
 
4 2 1 2 2 NEGLIGENCE 
 
Mens rea includes both intention and negligence. Negligence occurs when the offence has 
occurred unintentionally or accidentally.191 This form of fault arises because a person’s 
conduct did not meet the standards required by law.192 Where the person did not act as the 
reasonable man would have acted he has fault in the form of culpa.193 
 
When referring to negligence section 332(1) refers to an act performed without a particular 
intent. In Ex parte Minister of Justice, In re South African Broadcasting Corporation,194 the 
Court had to decide on two questions, namely: 
                                                 
186  Snyman Criminal Law 180. 
187  1992 4 SA 804 (A) 808-809. 
188  Clarkson “Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls” (1996) 59 MLR 557, 563 cited by Reed 
& Seago Criminal Law 184.  
189  1992 4 SA 807 (A). 
190  Supra. 
191  Snyman Criminal Law 208. 
192  Supra. 
193  Supra. 
194   1992 4 SA 804 (A). 
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 (1)  Whether the proper interpretation of section 332(1) refers to intention only or whether 
it also refers to negligence.195 The court held that on a proper interpretation of section 
332 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 a juristic person can also be liable 
for crimes of negligence committed by its directors and officers.196  
(2)  Whether the decision in R v Bennett and Co (Pty) Ltd197 was correct  when the court 
held that the negligence of an employee was imputed to the company, resulting in the 
company being convicted of culpable homicide.198 The Court in In re South African 
Broadcasting Corporation held that R v Bennett was correctly decided,199 because 
negligence based on omission can result in culpable homicide, where the body 
corporate had a duty to protect persons from serious bodily harm or death.200 Those 
persons could be its employees or persons using its product.201 
 
4 2 1 2 3 STRICT LIABILITY 
 
Mens rea is a common element for liability in criminal law202 but there are instances where a 
person is liable for a criminal offence without mens rea. In most cases this liability arises 
from statutory offences where the Legislature is silent about culpability.203 Strict liability 
offences are established with a justification to ensure compliance with regulatory norms.204  
 
The words “without intent” in section 322(1) include liability of the corporate bodies for 
offences committed by directors or servants without fault.205 The prevalent statutory offences 
with strict liability are those legislated to regulate environmental pollution where corporate 
bodies are the main culprits.206 Although vicarious liability and strict liability have the 
advantage of being the easiest tools for the state to prove the commission of the offence, they 
have the disadvantage of being liability without fault. 
                                                 
195  Supra 810. 
196  Supra . 
197  See Chapter 2 pg 15 121. 
198  Ex parte Minister of Justice, In re South African Broadcasting Corporation supra 807. 
199  Supra 810. 
200  Clough & Mulhern The Prosecution of Corporations (2002) 181. 
201  Supra. 
202   R v Wunderlich 1912 TPD 1118. 
203  Snyman Criminal Law 242. 
204  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 315-8. 
205  S 321 of Act 51 of 1977. 
206  Wells Corporation and Criminal Responsibility 2nd ed (2001) 6-13. 
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 Strict liability has been criticized for being unconstitutional.207 O’Regan J in S v Coetzee208 
said: 
 
“The striking degree of correspondence between different legal systems in relation to an 
element of fault in order to establish criminal liability reflects a fundamental principle of 
democratic societies; as a general rule people who are not at fault should not be deprived of 
their freedom by state.  This rule is the corollary of another rule which the same 
comparative exercise illustrates; when a person has committed an unlawful act 
intentionally or negligently, the state may punish them.  Deprivation of liberty, without 
established culpability, is a breach of this established rule. Where culpability is established 
and conduct is legitimately deemed unlawful, then no such breach arises.”209  
 
It may be argued that strict liability like vicarious liability without fault is necessary. This 
view is based on the fact that the limitation clause210 in our Constitution may allow the 
legislature to constitutionally create strict liability offences more particularly to regulate 
environmental protection from agents of corporate bodies.211 
 
4 2 1 3 EXPRESS OR IMPLIED PERMISSION 
 
The director or servant of the corporate body must either give express or implied permission 
to a third person prior to the corporate body incurring liability. The word “permission” 
attributes the knowledge of either the director or that of the servant to the company.212 Such 
knowledge includes intention or recklessness.213 The express and implied permission relates 
to the actus reus of the director or servant but not his omission.214 
 
In countries where express or implied permission of the director or servant applies to an 
omission the corporate body is liable where the director or servant knew that the offence was 
being committed but failed to prevent it.215 The same can apply to the director who knows 
                                                 
207  Snyman Criminal Law 243. 
208  1997 1 SACR 379 (CC). 
209  Supra 442 par 76. 
210  S 36 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
211  S v Magagula 2001 2 SACR 123 (T). 
212  Supra. 
213  Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 106-110. 
214  See footnote 174 supra. 
215  In English law supra 109. 
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that the offence is likely to be committed but ignores the eventuality. This is sometimes 
referred to as wilful blindness.216 
                                                
 
In James & Son Ltd v Smee,217 the court held that in regard to the word “permitting” the use 
of this word at once imports a state of mind.  It was further held that a person might permit 
another to use a vehicle with defective brakes, when knowing that the brakes are not working. 
The person who permits the use of that motor vehicle can be convicted if he had the 
prescience knowledge that the brakes are out of order.218 He must have turned a blind eye to 
the obvious by impliedly permitting the use of a defective motor vehicle.219 This liability can 
also be attributed to the corporate body. 
 
In Vehicle Inspectorate v Nuttal,220 the court held that the meaning of the word “permitted” 
depends on the context in which it was used.221 Where someone had a duty to take reasonable 
steps to prevent a certain occurrence and he failed to do so it would lead to the conclusion that 
he permitted the occurrence.222 Where someone is reckless as to whether or not something 
unlawful occurs he has the required mens rea by permitting it.223 This liability applies to 
corporate bodies, too. 
 
4 2 1 4 EXERCISING POWERS OR PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES 
 
The director or servant must perform the unlawful act or omission during the course of his 
employment.224 The words “exercise of powers and performance of duties” apply equally to 
both the director and the servant. 
 
Barlow argues225 that power is only exercised by directors, and not by servants. He further 
argues that the performance of duties applies only to servants and not to directors. If Barlow’s 
arguments are correct, the director can instruct another person, not employed by the corporate 
 
216  Supra. 
217  1953 QB 78, 1954 3 All ER 273, D.C.  
218  Supra. See Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (1978) 934-944. 
219  Supra. 
220  1999 WLR 629, HL.  
221  Supra. 
222  Supra.  
223  Supra 217. 
224  Feldman Pty Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733 736. 
225  Barlow “The Criminal Liability of a Company: Its Directors and Its Servants” 502 504-505. 
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body, to act only when exercising his or her powers. Similarly the servant too can instruct the 
third person to act for the corporate body when performing his or her duties. The corporate 
body cannot be liable where the director instructed another person to act whilst performing his 
duties or where the servant instructed another person to act in exercise of his powers. 
 
4 2 1 5 FUTHERING THE INTEREST OF THE CORPORATION 
 
The words “furthering the interest of the corporation” also include the intent to benefit the 
corporate body.226 The act must be performed within the scope of the director’s or the 
servant’s employment.227 That the corporation is liable for an offence committed by a servant 
in furthering or endeavouring to further the interest of the corporate body was confirmed in S 
v African Bank of South Africa Ltd.228 The court held that where the agents furthered their 
own interests and in the process had to further the interest of the corporate body the corporate 
body should be liable. Liability exists when the agent, while furthering the interest of the 
corporate body, took advantage of the situation and furthered his own interest.229 
 
According to the decision in R v Meer230 if the corporation, which was created for a lawful 
purpose, decides to follow unlawful ends, it would still be liable for the acts of its director or 
servant who exercised powers in the performance of their duties. Where the director or 
servant committed an offence in order to further his or her own interest, the corporate body 
would not be liable.231   
 
Where the employee commits a crime in order to further the corporate body’s interest, the 
latter is liable even where the employee acted beyond the scope of his employment, because 
the employee was not acting in his own interest.232 In Banur Investments (Pty) Ltd,233 a 
record clerk who was not authorised to sell liquor concluded sales in contravention of the 
liquor licence.  The court held that she was not acting in her own interest, but for the benefit 
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of the corporation.234 The court held that the liability of the corporate body exists because the 
corporate body is liable for the wrongs if its agents, not because the corporate authorised 
them, but because these wrongful acts were committed in the conduct of its affairs.235 The 
court held that the sale of liquor was for the benefit of the employer and not for the barman’s 
personal benefit.236  
 
Criticism against holding the body corporate liable even when the agent acted ultra vires237 is 
that the company only permits its agents to perform intra vires acts.238 In R v Booth Road 
Trading Pty Ltd,239 a new salesman had been specifically forbidden to effect sales during the 
first two weeks of his employment. He sold goods in excess of the maximum statutory price 
during those two weeks. The corporate body was liable because the servant was employed to 
sell goods. He was a servant doing his job to further the interest of his employer, but 
according to the instruction that he was not to sell for two weeks. 
 
4 2 1 6 TYPES OF OFFENCES COMMITTED BY THE BODY CORPORATE 
 
Section 332 (1) refers to “any offence” when describing offences which can be committed by 
the corporate body. The words “any offence” make the ambit of corporations’ criminal 
liability too wide. There are authorities who agree that there is no offence, both under 
common law and statutory law which cannot be committed by the corporate body.240 There 
are authorities who argue that not all offences under both common law and statutory law can 
be attributed to the corporate body.241  
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4 2 1 6 1 COMMON LAW OFFENCES 
 
A corporate body cannot be convicted of rape, since the offence can only be committed by a 
natural person.242 Burchell argues that a corporation that creates a working environment 
conducive to the commission of sexual offences or does not prevent the probable risk that 
such offences be committed could be found guilty as an accomplice where its director or 
servant has committed such an offence.243  
 
The question whether a South African corporation could be convicted of treason has not been 
decided by the courts.  
 
A juristic person can be found guilty of culpable homicide based on a positive act or a failure 
to act.244 A corporate body can be convicted of murder where the corporate body foresaw that 
its action could result in the death of a person.245 Where corporate bodies are convicted of 
common law offences a fine is imposed as a sentence. Where the prescribed sentence is 
imprisonment the corporation can still be convicted as the courts are given discretion to 
impose a fine instead of imprisonment.246  
 
4 2 1 6 2 STATUTORY OFFENCES 
 
Just like in common law offences the corporate body is liable for contravening statutory 
offences. Not all statutory offences can be attributed to the corporate bodies when these are 
committed by directors or servants.247 In R v Sutherland,248 the court held that there are 
certain offences in the Liquor Act 30 of 1928 which cannot be committed by the corporation 
because the prohibition is directed to the licence holder personally, who will always be a 
natural person.  
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The words “any offence” do not include commissions and omissions, which are punishable 
under the Companies Act 61 of 1973, for which directors and officers will be liable.249 
 
In S v International Computer Broking and Leasing Pty Ltd and Another,250 the body 
corporate was convicted for contravening the provisions of section 2(1)(a) of the Usury Act 
73 of 1968. The Company lent money and charged interest rates at 120% per annum.251 The 
permissible interest rate allowed then was 32% per annum.252 The court held that the 
company was liable for commission of the offence on the basis of failure to comply with the 
provisions of section 2(1)(a) of the Usury Act 73 of 1968.253 The court held that the legal 
advice followed by the corporate body was so absurd as to be not acceptable to the reasonable 
man.254 
 
In S v Long Distance (Natal) Pty Ltd,255 the corporate body was charged for contravening 
section 31 of the Road Transportation Act 74 of 1977. The corporate body transported goods 
not specified in the transport permit.256 The court held that culpa was sufficient for conviction 
under paragraph (a) or (b) of section 31(1) of the Road Transportation Act 74 of 1977 since 
corporate bodies were obliged to take all reasonable care to acquaint themselves with what 
they are allowed to transport.257  
 
4 2 1 7 ATTRIBUTION 
 
The acts and the intentions of the agents are deemed to be the acts and the intentions of the 
body corporate. The law attributes acts and state of mind of these agents to the company 
because the latter has no hands and mind of its own.258 Those who represent and control the 
corporate body formulate the mind and perform acts for the corporate body.259 
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Where the agent’s act is attributed to the body corporate it does not cease to be his action as 
well.260 He acts for the body corporate and for himself, and the agent may be prosecuted 
individually under section 333(5). 
 
4 2 1 8 PERSONS WHOSE LIABILITY IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE BODY 
CORPORATE 
 
Section 332(1) does not limit the liability of the corporation only to acts or offences 
committed by its directors or servants.261 The offences can be committed by a third party, not 
employed by the corporate body, provided the third person acted on the instruction of the 
servant or the director of the company.262 
 
Three categories of persons’ liability can be attributed to the corporate body, namely 
directors, servants or third parties.  
 
4 2 1 8 1 DIRECTOR 
 
The word “director” is defined in section 332(10) of Act 51 of 1977 as a person who in 
relation to that body corporate has powers of control or to govern it.  The person can be a 
member of a body or group of persons who control or govern that body corporate.263  
 
Where a person is regarded as a director of a company, in terms of the definition as described 
in section 332(10), it is immaterial whether or not he or she is a director in terms of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973.264 In terms of section 332(1) a director’s liability is attributed to 
the body corporate. In R v Mall,265 the court held that there is no ground for limiting the 
language of section 332(10) to those who are constitutionally and legally vested with the 
control and government of the body corporate. Since those directors are required by statute266 
they are essential to a company and their functions and duties are defined by law.267  For 
purposes of criminal law a director need not be someone with the title “director”; it can be 
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anyone including the manager if he or she is involved in the governing and control of the 
corporate body. The court held that the plain words are “any person who controls or governs”, 
that is to say, in fact “controls or governs”.268 
 
The word “director” as defined in section 332(10) of Act 51 of 1977 has a broader meaning 
for criminal purposes than the meaning of the same word in the Companies Act 61 of 1973.269 
The latter Act imposes criminal liability only on directors of its own definition.270 Section 
1(1) of Companies Act 61 of 1973 defines the director as “any person occupying the position 
of a director or alternate director of a company by whatever name he may be designated”. A 
director is a person who directs the affairs of the company and he has the authority to exercise 
all the powers of the company except those exercised by the company in a general meeting.271 
 
The court further held that it is inconceivable that the legislature did not know and appreciate 
that corporate bodies, particularly companies, are sometimes controlled, wholly or partially, 
by persons who are not personally on the board of directors, but are represented there by a 
nominee.272 A nominee director is a person nominated to act as a director by another person, 
for example a shareholder of the company.273 Recognising that it is possible that a person 
should usurp the functions of a director, the court stated that if that should happen, there is no 
reason why he should not be treated as having brought himself within subsection (10) and so 
has taken upon himself the responsibilities placed on the director by the section.274  
 
A matter for argument is whether shadow directors should be liable in terms section 332(10). 
A shadow director is a person who to a greater extent influences the decisions of the directors 
in a company.275 This person does not acquire powers or rights in relation to the management 
of the company.276 A shadow director does not appear in South African Companies Act, but 
the concept of a controlling hand behind the director is known in our law. Courts have held 
that a person who manipulates a director does not escape the fiduciary duties of a director.277 
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 This extended meaning of the word “director” to include any person who governs or controls 
the company was confirmed in S v Marks.278 The accused, a stockbroker, was charged with 
fraud, i.e. “rigging the market”. The court held that the accused usurped the duties of being a 
director and he was accepted by the boards of the three companies as someone who takes the 
active role of influencing the way the boards conduct their affairs.279 He was in control and 
therefore a director of the three companies.280 
 
Although directors are for some reasons company managers their status as directors is 
different from that of a manager.281 The difference is that directors are required by the statute. 
The manager on the other hand is an employee of the corporate body under the control of the 
director. He is not legally essential to the corporate body.282 
 
In S v Van den Berg and Others,283 the court decided that section 332(10) with its extended 
definition of directors is of limited application, as it does no more than to define the directors 
referred to in section 332. The same definition of “director” cannot be extended beyond the 
scope of section 332 and in particular cannot be extended to other statutes where the same 
term is used.284 For purposes of corporate criminal liability the director is the one defined in 
section 332(10) of Act 51 of 1977.  
 
4 2 1 8 2 SERVANTS 
 
A servant of the corporate body includes any officer or employee, irrespective of the person’s 
rank in that corporate body.285  The word “servant” has not been defined.  It is submitted that 
a person qualifies to be a servant of the corporate body, if he/she is permanently employed or 
employed regularly on a contractual basis.286  
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In R v Mall it was held that it is possible that a manager could be both a servant and a 
director,287 depending on the nature of the contract of employment.288 A servant is a person, 
who, in carrying out duties on behalf of the corporate body, has to obey the instructions of 
some superior officer of the corporate body.289   
 
4 2 1 8 3 THIRD PERSON 
 
“Third person”290 refers to a person who is not employed by the corporate body. Section 
332(1) extends the liability for actions of a third person to a corporate body if he acted with 
the permission, express or implied, of the director or servant of the company.  It can be 
argued that the permission given by the director or servant should be acceptable only if given 
during the exercise of their powers and duties,291 in furthering or endeavouring to further the 
interest of the corporate body.292 
 
Third persons can also include self-employed persons or independent contractors. A self-
employed person or an independent contractor has to act with the permission, express or 
implied, for the corporate body to be held liable. A self-employed person contracted to be a 
traffic manager of the company was regarded as the third person in that his conduct and men 
rea was attributed to the company.293 
 
4 3 CRITICISM OF SECTION 332(1) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, 
51 OF 1977 
 
Section 332(1) provides that the corporate body will be liable for all acts of its directors, 
servants or third persons instructed by the director or servant, if done in furthering or in an 
endeavour to further the interests of that corporate body. Section 332(1), although vicarious in 
nature, is too broad to extend beyond the normal limits of vicarious liability.294 Vicarious 
liability results in the employer being liable for actions performed by its employee during the 
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course of his employment. Liability of the company in terms of section 332 (1) occurs even 
when the agent acted ultra vires.295  
 
Every wrongful act of an employee of the corporate body, committed during the course of his 
employment, is accountable to the corporate body whether or not it was aware of the 
actions.296 This may be a sufficient deterrence to the corporation, but Clarkson and Keating 
argue that it extends the corporation’s liability too widely in that the corporation can be liable 
for an offence where it has expressly forbidden the offence.297 That the corporate body is 
liable for wrongful acts of every employee, and third persons instructed by them, is 
burdensome to the company.  
 
Section 332(1) extends vicarious liability to absolute liability.  If the requirements of section 
332(1) are proved, the corporate body is guilty, with no other possible defence.298 According 
to Kahn, vicarious liability is presently manifest in section 332(1) as a legal straightjacket 
from which even a Houdini of the law could not escape.299  
 
The wording of section 332(1) which includes acts of third parties who were acting on 
instruction of a director or servant of the corporate body in the exercise of his powers or in the 
performance of his duties by furthering the interest of the corporate body, has given rise to 
interpretation problems in South African courts.300 As a result courts have formulated a 
restrictive interpretation of the section in that the corporate body must have a degree of 
control over the third person.301  
 
In S v Coetzee302 the court stated that nobody was prepared to defend the extension of liability 
to servants, as the provision does.  The court held that there is no justification for including 
the category of “servants” in the provision and then proceeded to analyse the provisions of 
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section 332(5) on the basis that the section refers only to directors.303 Although not referring 
to section 332(1), the remarks in S v Coetzee304 can be used as an argument in favour of the 
body corporate, namely that section 332(1) extends its liability too widely by including 
servants. 
 
Many South African writers do not accept vicarious liability as a basis for criminal liability 
because it promotes liability without fault.305 In addition the corporate body is liable for the 
fault of its director or servant without enquiry of fault in regard to it or its corporate culture 
and policies.306 Some authors argue that section 332(1) may be unconstitutional because it 
creates no fault liability.307 Various South African writers have raised concerns about the 
wide scope of section 332(1).308 Corporate criminal liability should be limited only to 
controlling officers who direct the “mind and the will” of the corporate body.309 However, in 
the dissenting judgment in S v Coetzee310 Kentridge A J held that not all cases involving strict 
liability are unconstitutional.311 Common purpose which has the effect of imputing liability of 
one person to another has been declared constitutional.312 
 
4 4 COMPARISONS OF SECTION 332(1) AND OTHER MODELS OF 
DERIVATIVE LIABILITY 
 
Section 332(1) creates only one form or model as the basis of corporate criminal liability. The 
agency doctrine in section 332(1) is out of touch with modern developments,313 because two 
or more models of derivative liability often exist in other countries, which include the agency 
doctrine, identification doctrine and the aggregation theory.314 
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Some scholars argue that the liability based on agency is expensive.315 They further argue that 
corporate criminal liability is best evaluated as a substitute for the direct criminal liability of 
the agent.316  
 
In England, New Zealand, Canada and some common law jurisdictions the agency doctrine 
has been supplemented by identification, whereas in the United States of America aggregation 
supplements agency. Section 332(1) does not accommodate the aggregation principle in that it 
is a liability of a director or servant, not a group of persons in the collective body structure 
that is imputed to the corporate body. Section 332(1) is wider in identification since it does 
not limit the liability to those persons who represent the corporate body by directing its mind 
and will. Section 332(1) is similar to the respondeat superior doctrine also used in USA based 
on the Model Penal Code.317 
 
4 5 COMMON PURPOSE 
 
Common purpose is a general principle in criminal law where two or more people, having a 
common intent to commit an offence, act together in order to achieve a common goal. The 
action by either of them in the execution of that purpose is imputed to the other.318 
 
The argument is whether the corporate body is acting on common purpose with its director or 
servant to be liable in criminal law. This has to do with the perpetrator-corporation 
relationship, since it is the act and mind of the agent that are attributed to the corporation. The 
conspiracy theory  allows the conspirator to be liable for the crimes committed by other 
conspirators in the furtherance of conspiracy,319 even if the conspirator was not able to 
commit the offence himself.320  
 
It is open to doubt whether it can be assumed that the corporation can be a partner in criminal 
conspiracy.321 If common purpose and corporate criminal liability are similar corporate 
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criminal liability is constitutional because common purpose has already been declared to be 
constitutional.322 
 
4 6 CONCLUSION 
 
The South African model of corporate criminal liability in section 332(1) is essentially 
vicarious because it is based on the special relationship between the director or servant and 
the corporate body. Section 332(1) is vicarious in nature, but broader than vicarious liability 
of a human being.323 A natural person as an employer is vicariously liable for the criminal 
acts of his employee that was performed within the scope of the employment.324 In contrast, 
under section 332(1), the corporate body is liable for all the acts of its directors or servants 
even if they fall outside the course and scope of their employment, when performed in an 
endeavour to further the interests of the corporate body.325  
                                                
 
The theoretical basis of the provisions of section 332(1) is that the juristic person on its own 
cannot perform the actus reus and is incapable of having the required fault.326 The crimes 
committed by the director or servants are deemed to be that of the corporate body.327 All 
elements of the offence must be proved to have been committed by the director, servant or the 
third person and not by the corporate body.328 Vicarious liability is very harsh on the 
corporate body when extended to all company employees. It is recommended that at least a 
certain level of the management of the company be targeted329 in order to limit the corporate 
body’s liability to a limited number of individuals who represent, govern or manage the 
corporate body.330  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DESIRABILITY OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABLITY 
 
5 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Criminal law “defines certain forms of human conduct as crimes and provides for the 
punishment of those persons with criminal capacity who unlawfully and with a guilty mind 
commit crime”.331 This Chapter evaluates whether corporate criminal liability can be included 
in the above-mentioned definition. Criminal law prescribes unlawful conduct and purports to 
direct the behaviour of individuals to be in line with society’s interest and values.332 The 
question is whether the same purpose can be achieved with corporate bodies. 
 
A corporate body is an institution not capable of acting on its own nor able to formulate its 
own intention.333 Some authors argue that the corporate body acts and thinks through its 
members and employees and only they deserve punishment.334 Vicarious liability is based on 
principles of civil law, in that the master can be held liable for the actions of his servant even 
if he never knew or foresaw that the offence will be committed.335  
 
Substantive criminal law, with the exception of strict liability, does not permit the imputation 
of will and act of one person to another nor does it accept the theory of identification.336 
Criminal law emphasizes personal liability and is reluctant to accept that the unlawful conduct 
of one person can be made that of another.  
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5 2 LEGAL PERSONALITY 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a company or corporate body has the same rights and duties in law 
as natural persons, despite the fact that it has no physical existence.337 Corporations have 
identifiable persona and have presence in the community.338 Each and every corporation has 
its own culture, its own way of giving skills to its employees as well as its own practices.339 
These practises collectively give a corporation a unique character.340 
 
A corporation possesses an “ethos” which distinguishes it from the specific individuals who 
control or work for the corporation.341 Corporate ethos is defined as the theoretical and 
intangible character of a corporation separate from the substance of what it actually does, 
whether manufacturing, retailing, financing or other activity.342 Each corporation is 
distinctive and draws its uniqueness from a multifaceted combination of formal and informal 
ctors.343 
e directors and officials of the 
orporate body are furthering the interest of the corporation.  
rate body. A corporation can express 
xclusive viewpoints, attitudes and moral judgments.347 
                                                
fa
 
The formal structure of a corporation is identifiable and observable.344 These formal and 
informal factors and structures serve to inform and advance the conduct and actions of the 
corporation through its employees or agents.345 If these arguments are accepted there is 
justification for allowing corporate criminal liability becaus
c
 
In FNB of Boston v Bellotti,346 the court acknowledged that the voice with which the 
corporation speaks in public represents an interest distinct from that of the individuals, or 
groups of individuals, who manage or work for the corpo
e
 
337  Chapter 2 par 1. 
338  Friedman “In Defence of Corporate Criminal Liability” Vol 23 (Summer 2000) Harvard Journal of Law 
and Public Policy 846 – 847. 
339  Supra. 
340  Supra. 
341  Bucy “Corporate Ethos: A Standard of Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability” (1991) 75 Minn Law 
Review 1095 1117-18 1099 cited by Friedman “In Defence of Corporate Criminal Liability” 847.   
342  Supra. 
343  Bucy “Corporate Ethos: A Standard of Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability” 1123. 
344  Supra 1127. 
345  Bucy “Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse” (1992) 71 Wash U.L.Q.329, 
339. 
346  435 U.S.765 1978. 
347  Supra. 
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 When one accepts this position the argument that corporations do not deserve retribution 
because they consist of nothing more than the individuals of whom they are composed, and 
therefore lack autonomous identifiable persona may be untrue.348 Corporate criminal liability 
is an indispensable part of the law.  According to Snyman corporate bodies govern our lives 
to a certain degree in that business affecting many nations worldwide is run by 
corporations.349 An argument in support of corporate criminal liability is that the corporate 
ody is more identifiable than the members constituting it.350 
 3 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY  
weeds because “nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody 
lanted it, and it just grew”. 
 3 1 CRITICISM OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
for the violation of that law, which in respect of these two great faculties, namely that he has a 
                                                
b
 
5
 
This is a hot debate world-wide with voluminous literature debating the desirability of 
imposing criminal liability on corporations.351 Mueller352 compared the development of the 
theory of corporate criminal liability in countries with an Anglo-American legal system 
influence to the growth of 
p
 
5
 
Critics of corporate criminal liability often ask whether corporate bodies should be punished 
for human ambitions.353 According to Hale criminal liability and human consciousness co-
exist.354 A human being has two great faculties: understanding and liberty of will and as a 
result can be subjected to law.355 Consequently a human being can be guilty and be punished 
 
348  Friedman “In Defence of Corporate Criminal Liability” 847. 
349  Snyman Criminal Law 249. 
350  Geis & DiMento “The Empirical Evidence and the Legal Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability” Vol 
29 No 3 (Summer 2002) American Journal of Criminal Law 341, 343. 
351  The two major books with opposing views are Wells Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (1993) 
(pro corporate criminal liability) and Wolgast Ethics of an Artificial Person: Lost Responsibility in 
Professions and Organizations (1992) (anti). Many writers have summary of these arguments. Becker 
“Corporate Successor Criminal Liability: The Real Crime” 16 American Journal of Criminal Law 
435,462-63. Fisse “Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and 
Sanctions” (1983) 56 S. Cal Law Review 1141 1244; Coffee infra and many others. 
352  Mueller “Mens Rea and the Corporation” (1957) 19 U Pitt L Review 21. 
353  Supra. 
354  Hale The History of the Pleas of the Crown (1971) 14 (Emlyn ed 1736) 1971. 
355  Supra. 
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capacity for duty to obey.356 This explains the reason why it may be dangerous to impute 
criminal liability to corporations, which by their nature lack consciousness.  
 
Many nations world-wide do not criminalize corporate actions, because there is no basis in 
empirical research to justify a departure from the general rule of mens rea, a standard that can 
sensibly be applied only to human beings and not to corporations.357 This view appears to be 
in line with the corporate culture which is proposed to be the form of liability where the 
corporate policy shall be made equivalent to the corporate body’s intention.358  
 
Another view is that both the courts and Parliaments never considered the cumulative merits 
or demerits of imposing criminal liability on corporate bodies.359 They failed to consider the 
principle or its practical implications.360 Some critics do not see the need of imposing fines at 
the expense of serious harm and great profits made by the corporations.361 
 
It is important to consider whether we should make a distinction between corporate bodies 
and human beings. Some authors regard the existence of a corporate body as a mere legal 
fiction, being an entity that can never function without the presence of a human being.362 The 
corporate body does not have morals and feelings, hence the question: why punish the 
corporations at all?363 
 
5 3 2 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
Those who support corporate criminal liability argue that this liability promotes safe corporate 
measures by companies to protect human beings.364 Possible criminal liability serves to 
control those corporate bodies that would seek profit at the expense of people’s lives and risks 
                                                 
356  Supra. 
357  Mueller “Mens Rea and the Corporation” supra. 
358  Fisse “Recent Developments in Corporate Criminal Law and Corporate Liability to Monetary Penalties” 
(1990) 13 UNSWLJ 1 15-16. 
359  Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 869. 
360  Supra. 
361  Supra. 
362  Comment “Corporate Criminal Liability” (1928) 28 Columbia Law Review 6-7. Comment “The Economic 
Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability (1982) 73 J Crim L & Criminology 582 584. 
363  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law Cases & Materials 8th ed (2002) 289. 
364  Kahan & Nussbaum “Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law” (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review 
269 350. 
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to their lives.365 Criminal liability sends the message that people matter more than profits and 
reaffirms the value of those who were sacrificed to corporate greediness.366 
 
Without criminal liability corporations would escape moral condemnation for wrongdoing.367 
Corporate criminal liability will reduce the harm inflicted by corporate bodies.368  
 
Corporate criminal liability is necessary in order to achieve the intention of the legislature in 
statutes, which regulate pollution, health, safety and business.369 The value of human health 
and safety, for example, would be regarded as less important when denied by corporations as 
opposed to the beliefs of individuals.370 Corporate exemption from criminal liability would 
undermine the condemnatory effect of criminal liability on individuals in respect to similar 
conduct and ultimately diminish the moral authority of the criminal law as a guide to rational 
and accepted behaviour.371 
 
5 4 CIVIL LIABILITY V CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
The main debate is whether solutions should be sought from criminal law or civil law or both. 
One school of thought suggests that corporate criminal liability concerns criminal behaviour 
which demands the application of criminal law even if it is applied to a legal person.372 The 
other school of thought is of the view that civil sanctions are the best tool to deal with the 
conduct of corporations which are not natural persons.373 Criminal and civil corporate liability 
have two things in common, namely the imposition of liability on the corporation and the aim 
of deterrence.374 
 
                                                 
365  Reed & Seago Criminal Law 184. 
366  Kahan “Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime” (1998) 27 J Legal Stud 609 618-19 cited 
by Friedman “In Defence of Corporate Criminal Liability” 855.    
367  Friedman “In Defence of Corporate Criminal Liability” 855. 
368  Wells Corporations and Criminal Responsibility 15. 
369  Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 252; Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 562. 
370  United States v Wilson 133 F.3d 251 4 th Cir.1997. 
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373  Khaana “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose it Serve?” Vol 109 No 7 (May 1996) Harvard Law 
Review 1477, 1510. He states that corporate criminal liability serves no purpose. 
374  Supra 1492. 
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5 4 1 CIVIL LIABILITY 
 
Some critics of corporate criminal liability maintain that corporate criminal liability serves no 
purpose because there are civil enforcement strategies that can be used.375 
 
The criminal route stigmatises the company being prosecuted,376 and has the effect that 
customers and employees of the company might refuse to deal with the company in the 
future.377 The stigma results in damage to the reputation of the corporation,378 and could 
result in over deterrence.379 
                                                
 
Khaana argues that380 there is no reason why corporate criminal liability should be regarded 
as the best way to influence corporate behaviour because corporations cannot be imprisoned. 
Fischell and Sykes381 support this view and argue that civil remedies are more appropriate.  
Khaana argues that one must compare the net benefit of imposing alternative liability 
strategies such as the civil liability forum.382 The public enforcement goal can be efficiently 
accomplished through civil liability regimes.383 Civil proceedings may allow for information-
gathering powers similar to criminal proceedings, and would lessen the effect of the corporate 
criminal liability.384  
 
Corporate criminal liability discourages the corporation from creating effective incentives in 
order to engage in social optimal behaviour.385 Corporations do not spend enough money to 
ensure that the internal corporate monitoring prevents misconduct.386 Economic analyses 
indicate that civil liability in the corporate context may be a more efficient deterrent than 
criminal liability.387  
 
 
375  Khaana “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?” supra 1534. 
376  Block “Optimal Penalties Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behaviour” (1991) 71 B.U.L. Rev 
395 414-15. This writer maintains that reputation loss occurs from both criminal and civil liability. 
377  Charney “Non legal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships” 104 Harvard Law Review 373 393-397. 
378  Fischell & Sykes “Corporate Crimes” (1996) 25 J Legal Stud 319 324 332. 
379  Supra. 
380  Khaana “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purposes Does It Serve?” 1477. 
381  Fischell & Sykes “Corporate Crimes” supra 319 320. 
382  Khaana “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose it Serve?” supra 1492.  
383  Khaana “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose it Serve?” supra 1521. 
384  Hughes “Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury; Converging Streams of Criminal and Civil 
Process” (1994) 47 VAND. L. REV 573 574-5. 
385  Fischell & Sykes “Corporate Crimes” supra 342-343.  
386  Fischell & Sykes “Corporate Crimes” supra 323-4. 
387  Khaana “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose it Serve?” supra 1530. 
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The imposition of criminal sanction on a corporation, an artificial entity which can possess no 
state of mind, is questionable in the absence of some theory which ascribes fault to the 
corporation itself, rather than to its officers, directors and employees.388 To prosecute the 
directors and servants of the corporate body is not fair and effective, because the convictions 
of the corporation’s officers and employees will not change the policy of the corporation and 
the way it functions.389 
 
Criminal corporate liability is not as efficient as civil liability, because the sanctions used to 
control unlawful corporate conduct, such as fines, probation, debarment, loss of licence and 
related penalties exist in corporate civil liability.390 Imposing a fine is cheaper to administer 
than any other sanction because there are administrative fines which can be imposed without 
taking the corporate body to court.391 Debarment would prevent the corporations conducting 
business with government from contracting with government departments for a period 
specified by the court in the debarment order.392 Corporate probation occurs when the 
corporate body is compelled by a court to change those policies and procedures that were 
amenable to the commission of the offence.393 
 
5 4 2 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
Corporate crime is a contravention of regulations intended to control corporations’ conduct 
and is a commission of an offence such as any other offence applicable to individuals.394 The 
offences committed in breach of those regulations are intended to protect the public and 
employees on issues of health, safety at the work place, and in general.395 Corporations can 
also be convicted of public welfare offences.396  
 
The majority view appears to be that the doctrine is ill considered, but this may be due to the 
fact that critics are more likely to voice their opinions than those who are satisfied with the 
                                                 
388  Radin “The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality” (1932) 32 Columbia Law Review 643 657. 
389  Stessens “Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective” 493-520. 
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status quo.397 Another argument is that the corporation should be criminally liable because it 
has corporate influence on employees, who are likely to engage in actions that they otherwise 
would not have engaged in, but for the employment.398 
 
There is an incipient consensus developing throughout the world that normalisation of 
corporate crime is a requirement for satisfactory control of organizational law violation.399 
The state as the custodian of the rights of its citizens has a legitimate interest in prosecuting 
those who breach regulations and commit crime.400  
 
Corporate criminal activity needs to be regulated because a corporation can kill, maim and 
poison.401 Just like the case with individuals there is occasional deviance by corporations.402 
Corporations can create hazardous situations, which are risky to humankind.403 Civil remedies 
alone cannot control such conduct.404  
 
Any conduct which is a threat to public safety invites the application of public law, which 
includes criminal law.405 The purpose of criminal law is to lay down acceptable behavioural 
standards in our societies, communities and nations.406 Criminal law is one of the methods 
used to ensure social control, but it is different in that it carries punishment.407 
 
There are also transnational corporate crimes, which are the result of the organized conduct of 
corporate bodies that do business in two or more nations.408 The prevention of organized 
crime is a priority of most nations.409 By charging individuals who work for a business 
involved with a crime and related activities conducted on behalf of business interests, society 
is directly recognizing that the business is not always an anonymous body devoid of 
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individual actors.410 Coercive powers of the state should be used where there is harm directed 
at the public.411  
 
Corporate bodies cannot be imprisoned, and they are sentenced to pay fines. Paying fines is an 
integral characteristic of criminal law.  In New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 
Company v United States412 the court held that the act of the agent, while exercising the 
authority delegated to him to make rates for transportation, may be controlled in the interest 
of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the 
corporation for which he is acting. Corporations are major role-players in the corporate world 
and to exonerate corporations from criminal liability, based on the view that corporations lack 
capacity to commit crimes, would eliminate the reason for controlling corporate conduct.413 
 
It is submitted that corporate criminal liability has better procedural protection measures than 
corporate civil liability because it has stronger enforcement mechanisms, more severe and, 
arguably, unique sanctions (such as stigma) and is a better deterrent.414 
 
5 4 3 THE EFFECT OF IMPOSING BOTH CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILTY 
 
It is common for certain actions to have both civil and criminal consequences.  Criminal and 
civil remedies supplement each other. Using both remedies has been followed for centuries all 
over the world. 
 
Asset forfeiture, commonly used in some countries, including South Africa, in order to fight 
the profiting in crime, is applied in  criminal courts, although having civil law procedure and 
concequences. The state confiscates money, goods and property bought with money which 
was unlawfully obtained. This system applies to individuals and corporations. Asset forfeiture 
is a supplementary measure against the corporation which is essential because it deprives the 
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corporate body the fruits of crime.415 It addresses both criminal and civil law objectives in 
that it is justified by the principle of restoration.416  
                                                
 
Simpson researched whether criminal penalties against corporations and/or their culpable 
employees are effective strategies417 and concluded that, at best, results of the rare studies are 
open to doubt.418 She found only a few oddments in her research to support either viewpoint 
and came to the conclusion that such studies are not conclusive. 
 
It is wise to implement any advantageous programme such as a compliance programme 
whether under civil or criminal law. A compliance programme is any programme that seeks to 
ensure that the corporate body complies with the law.419 For corporations, just like 
individuals, it is possible to use both criminal and civil corporate criminal liability. 
 
5 5 THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
Coffee explains that the study of corporate criminal liability has been confused by authors 
who are interested in justifying the use of retributive principles on corporate bodies.420 This 
approach complicates how the legal fiction of corporate personality can function with legal 
fiction of mens rea, and fails to explain how deterrence is applicable when the offence has 
been committed by the corporation.421  
 
Fines imposed on the companies are paid to the detriment of the shareholders who own the 
corporate body.422 This is unnecessary punishment because they have no control over the 
functionaries and the management of the company except the right to vote them out, a right 
that is applied late when damage has been done.423 Occasionally this affects the innocent 
consumers of the product because the price may be increased.424  
 
 
415  Lederman The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1985) 332. 
416  Supra. 
417  Simpson Corporate Crime, Law and Social Control (2002) cited by Geis & DiMento (2002) American 
Journal of Criminal Law 347. 
418  Supra. 
419  Huff, Note “The Role of Corporate Compliance Programs in Determining Corporate Criminal Liability: A 
Suggested Approach” (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review 1252-1253. 
420  Coffee (1980) Mich Law Review supra. 
421  Supra. 
422  Lederman The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1985) 315 & 319. 
423  Supra. 
424  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 186. 
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Clarkson and Keating argue that individuals within the company are not the only ones who 
deserve to be punished, but in order to be deterred from committing crime the company 
should also be punished.425 The corporate structure places corporate pressures on the 
employees, and those pressures continue to exist even after the employee has been sacrificed 
by the corporate body.426 
 
Lederman submits that corporate criminal liability is a challenge to the ideological and 
normative basis of criminal law which is that of expression and operation.427 This view is 
correct because it was the sudden need to control crime which led to the imposition of 
corporate criminal liability without established substantive law to suit the unique nature of 
corporate bodies, and to determine their liability. 
 
5 5 1 DETERRENCE 
 
The deterrence theory proposes that punishment must deter not only the offender but also 
future offenders.428 
 
Critics of corporate criminal liability assume that deterrence of unlawful conduct is the 
exclusive aim of both civil and criminal corporate liability.429 Deterrence cannot be seen as 
the sole purpose of punishment and should be taken into account with other theories of 
punishment, such as rehabilitation and prevention to be the central justification for criminal 
liability.430  
 
Deterrence alone is concerned with promoting “certain socially desirable consequences” or 
“good” ends.431 The potential imposition of punishment for wrong doing serves to encourage 
lawful behaviour by creating incentives to engage in reasonable conduct.432 
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Optimal deterrence of misconduct in the corporate context requires that the law offer 
incentives up to the point at which marginal cost would exceed the marginal gain in the form 
of reduced social harm from unlawful doings.433  
 
According to Friedman434  to eradicate the principle of corporate liability on the basis that it is 
not a deterrent is a mistake because it overlooks retribution as a normative basis for criminal 
liability.435 Even in the corporate world there should be moral condemnation. There is a 
general feeling, based on public policy, that corporations just like individuals, deserve to be 
punished or morally condemned for actions they do unlawfully.436 It is necessary to send a 
strong message to those controlling the company that unlawful acts are prohibited and to warn 
the public about such unlawful conduct.437 
 
The critics maintain that criminal proceedings against the individual offender are more 
deterrent than criminal proceedings based on derivative liability because in the latter scenario 
the corporate body pays.438 
 
5 5 2 RETRIBUTION 
 
The theory of retribution is based on the need to avenge, being the expression of the society’s 
anger and hate for the wrongdoing.439 It restores the legal balance which was disturbed by the 
commission of crime; it also assures the law-abiding citizens that crime does not pay.440  
 
Corporations are not inherently immune from expressive retributive concerns, because they 
possess discrete identities within the community to which expressive conduct can be 
ascribed.441 The corporation can suffer moral condemnation for its wrongdoing through 
criminal conviction and punishment, thereby vindicating the proper valuation of persons and 
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goods whose true worth was disparaged by the corporation’s conduct just as it is in the case of 
an individual wrongdoer.442 
 
When the corporation is convicted it is the effectuation of expressive retribution, just as in 
cases of individual accused.443 Notwithstanding the retributive character of some aspects of 
civil liability, only criminal liability is understood against the background of social norms, 
conveying the moral blame that expresses hate and anger which is a prerequisite for 
retribution.444  
 
Civil and criminal liability have distinct social meanings, and carry a judgment of liability 
differently in the civil context than in the criminal context.445 Findings of civil and criminal 
liability are not the same for purposes of moral blame.446  
 
Therefore retribution has less effect on the corporation as being a mental image than it has on 
its managers and agents who are physical beings.447 Retribution has no meaningful purpose in 
corporate criminal liability in so as far as it relates to the moral fitness of the citizens.448 It is 
necessary to condemn the unlawful conduct whether it has been done in the name of the 
corporation or not.  Civil sanction alone may not be enough. Civil remedies involve 
procedures which are not costly and are socially desirable.449 
 
The critics argue that retribution is not an important justification for imposing liability on 
corporations, because the objective of vindicating from the point of view of the victim and 
society cannot be achieved by punishing corporate bodies.450 The corporate body’s lack of 
physical being makes it insensitive to punishment as mode of social control.451 The 
shareholders’ profit in criminal activity (weighed against the objective of this theory) is more, 
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especially when the fine is less than profits made.452 Such unlawful profits gained infringe 
upon social balance in the society which suffers from unfair distribution of assets and 
resources.453 This can be remedied only by asset forfeiture which is to be discussed below.454  
 
5 5 3 REHABILITATION AND PREVENTION 
 
Disobedient corporations can be punished, for instance, by ordering the corporate bodies to 
allocate financial or personnel resources in order to perform certain duties for the benefit of 
public welfare, such as community service.455 This punishment not only serves to rehabilitate 
the corporate body but also prevents the future commission of similar illegal conduct. The 
community service rendered by the corporate body may not give rise to stigma but rather to a 
worthy name for the service it renders to the community.456  
 
Asset forfeiture which applies to natural persons also applies to corporate bodies.457 Asset 
forfeiture rehabilitates the corporate body and reinforces the lesson that crime does not pay. 
The question is whether it is the delinquent corporation or its delinquent employees who may 
be rehabilitated, because employees may be unwilling to be rehabilitated.458  
 
The most radical punishments for corporations include incarceration through “quarantine”, 
where the corporation may be forbidden to conduct certain activities or to conduct business in 
specified areas.459 The punishment which is equivalent to death penalty occurs where the 
corporation is ordered by court to dissolve.460 
 
5 6 CONCLUSION 
 
Arlen argues that empirical research should be conducted to determine the number of offences 
committed by corporate bodies and then it should be correlated with the various 
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consequences.461 This could provide a better understanding of what should be amended or 
moderated in the law of corporate criminal liability.462  
 
Corporate criminal liability is an established principle of law in many legal systems. The 
solution is to modernize the law by putting together those forms of sanctions, both under civil 
law and criminal law, having a logistic advantages such as alternative sentencing.463 Wisdom 
gained from having both criminal and civil remedies regarding individuals should apply to 
corporations. Both criminal and civil corporate criminal liability shall continue to be effective 
measures to regulate corporate conduct which is harmful to the public. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
The issue to be decided is whether to jettison corporate criminal.  It can be argued that it 
exists for a purpose.464 Throughout the world there is consensus that corporate criminal 
liability is a requirement for satisfactory control of  organised crime.465 
 
The corporate body has distinct existence which is separate from its members.  It is a legal 
person with rights in the Constitution similar to those of natural persons.  Its liability is based 
on attribution in that the conduct and fault of the employees are considered to be those of the 
corporate body.466  
 
The corporate guilt proposed in English law is more related to the principle of aggregation.467 
It advocates for the liability of the corporate body where there was management failure, which 
resulted in death of persons in instances where poor health and safety policies and practice 
played a part.468   
 
In the South African context it is submitted that our problem should not be directed to the 
existence of the Section 332(1), but that we should rather concentrate on ways of how to adapt 
it to our changing conditions.  We must develop strategies for limiting its harshness.  For 
example, to hold the company liable for criminal actions of a servant is unfair, because the 
corporation can be liable for actions of the lowest employee or a messenger. The lowest 
servant in most cases is not aware of the substance of the policies of the corporate body. 
Although it may be argued that if the servants do not know the contents of the policies of the 
company it is the fault of of the company, as good corporate governance requires the 
company to educate all servants and employees on corporate cultures and the content of 
policies of the entity.  The best plan is to eliminate the wider and narrower limits and put 
corporate criminal liability within acceptable limits.469  
  
                                                 
464  Du Plessis “Die Strafregtelike Aanspreeklikheid van Regspersone: ’n Menslike Benadering” 648. 
465  Geis and DiMento 2002 American Journal of Criminal Law Vol 29  363. 
466  Reed & Seago  Criminal Law 195. 
467  Law Com No 237 Legislating the Criminal Code  Involuntary Manslaughter (1996) para 8 1-8-77. 
468  Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 260-261. 
469  Du Plessis“Die Strafregtelike Aanspreeklikheid van Regspersone: ’n Menslike Benadering”  648. 
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Du Plessis submits that it would be fair and just if the corporate criminal liability in section 
332(1) is limited to directors and those officers who are controlling the company, i.e. those 
directing the mind and will of the corporation. 
 
This view is acceptable because it makes corporate criminal liability direct liability, which is a 
step closer to the liability of natural persons. This new liability can result in corporate killing, 
being a new species of an offence committed only by corporate bodies.470 In Britain the Law 
Commission recommended an offence which can be committed by a corporate body if the 
management failure caused the death of a person.471  Corporate punishment and corporate 
criminal liability have both philosophical and economic challenges.472   
 
Adopting various other forms of punishment, such as corporate probation orders, can solve 
problems relating to the punishment of the corporate body by fine.473 This punishment entails 
ordering the corporate body to engage in certain projects which are subject to certain 
supervision.474 This ensures a sentence that is rehabilitative. The corporate body on its own 
will use internal measures to discipline its employees, which will ensure that the misconduct 
is not committed again. Only recalcitrant corporations should receive severe deterrent 
punishment. There are also many available options of giving penalties to the corporate bodies 
which are creative: such as restraining orders, and orders to stop the corporate body from 
trading.475 Those orders can be reserved for the more serious transgressions by the corporate 
body.  
 
It is also suggested that corporate bodies be ordered to do community service.476 Community 
service takes away the stigma from the corporate body. Instead, the corporate body is 
involved in a constructive project, which gives fame and reputation to the corporate body 
which serves the community.477   
 
                                                 
470  Simester & Sullivan Criminal Law 261. 
471  In Australia the Criminal Code Act 1995 Part 2.5 introduced the corporate culture as the Federal Law.  
472  Sullivan & Simester Criminal Law 262 citing Lederman, “Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability, from adaptation and imitation towards aggregation and search for self identity” (2001) Buffalo 
Crim LR 642. 
473  Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law 121. 
474  Fisse & Braithwaite Corporations Crime and Accountability 42-83. 
475  Clough & Mulhern The Prosecution of Corporations 195-212. 
476  Fisse & Braithwaite Corporations Crime and Accountability 42-3  82-3. 
477  Rycroft (2004) 17 SACJ 154. 
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The statute law on asset forfeiture, which applies to individuals, may as well be applied to 
corporate bodies.478  Corporate criminal liability has developed as a result of need and 
convenience.479 Although this may be an imperfect law, corporate criminal liability appears to 
be accepted by some communities worldwide.480  
 
Some people argue that corporate criminal liability is desirable and just.  An important 
consideration is how it should be formulated, based on substantive criminal law.481  Wells 
argues that this may depend on the purpose of the punishment.482  
 
Corporate liability is necessary whether it is based on individual or collective liability.  The 
more appropriate view is that corporate criminal liability should be based on the management 
of the corporate body, considering its policies.483  It is submitted that it is not enough to base 
the liability of the corporation on its controlling officers.  It does happen that the corporate 
body can have more than one person directing the will and mind of the corporation.484  In 
Dredge & Dock Co v R,485 the Canadian Supreme Court expanded the identification theory on 
the understanding that corporations have more than one direction mind”.   
 
The best solution in refining the corporate criminal liability is to mix the individual and the 
corporate blameworthiness.486 Another view is that it is best to move from derivative forms of 
liability to the organizational models of corporate liability.487 This liability places more 
emphasis on the corporations’ policies, practices and corporate culture.   
 
The principle, on which corporate criminal liability should be based, urgently needs review in 
South Africa.488 We cannot rely on one basis for liability, i.e. the agency when various 
models serve different purposes.  The organizational principle of collective responsibility may 
also be necessary for South African needs.489  It can legitimatize the liability of the corporate 
                                                 
478  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 569. 
479  Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law 869. 
480  Supra. 
481  Wells Corporations and Criminal Responsibility 146.   
482  Supra. 
483  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 563. 
484  Supra . 
485  1985 1 SCR 662. 
486  Burchell 564 citing Clough and Mulhern The Prosecution of Corporations 139.   
487  Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law 120-121. 
488  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 565.   
489  Supra. 
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body in that it will deal with corporate faults. It can serve as an important ground to determine 
collective blameworthiness or mens rea that can be attributed to the corporate body.490  The 
organizational theory should address the control of managers “since the main issue in 
management is about control”.491 
 
The most effective way of dealing with corporate crime is to directly punish the corporations.  
Punishing individuals is not enough and is inefficient.492  Punishment in the form of a fine in 
our country is restrictive. There are many sentence options available to punish individuals. 
Where payment of a fine does not serve the desired purpose civil remedies must be applied.  
 
Corporate criminal liability occurs when the agent’s mental element is imputed to the 
corporation.  This is a common practice employed in many countries with tort law systems 
based on mens rea.493  The principle of ultra vires applied in Continental countries does not 
object to corporate criminal liability. 
 
It is easier to enforce criminal sanctions through international co-operation than it would be to 
enforce the civil liability and administrative sanctions.494  Adopting compliance programmes 
is another added measure used in other legal systems.495 Use of these programmes does not 
absolve the corporation from liability but at times it may serve as a mitigating factor.496 The 
shift in people’s attitudes to safety and health hazards resulted in the focus being directed to 
natural person rather than corporate accountability.497   There is international co-operation in 
combating crime throughout the world.498 International harmonization of the law of corporate 
liability could improve the situation.499   
                                                 
490  Bucy cited in Clough and Mulhern The Prosecution of Corporations 143. Burchell Principles of Criminal 
Law 565. 
491  Wells Corporations and Criminal Responsibility 150. 
492  Stessens “Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective” 518. 
493  Stessens “Corporate Criminal Liability :A Comparative Perspective”  519. 
494  Supra. 
495  Huff Note 1996 Columbia Law Review Vol. 96 1252-1298 supra. 
496  United States v Beusch 596 F 2d 871 C9th Cir 1979. 
497  Wells “The Millennium Bug and Corporate Criminal Liability” 1999 (2) The Journal of Information Law 
and Technology (JILT). [http://www.law.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/199-2/wells.html] 
498  Such as International Statutes to combat Corruption and Money Laundering. 
499  Stessens“Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective”  494. 
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